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§3. "Bestimmung des Begriffs..." / "Determination of the concept..."
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Heidegger:
»Die Logik« ist ein Gewächs der hellenistischen Schulphilosophie, die die philosophischen Forschungen der Vergangenheit schulmäßig bearbeitete. (Heidegger, 9)
Thus, on the one hand, a mere aping of Kant's doxa:
Die jetzige Logik schreibt sich her von Aristoteles' Analytik. Dieser Philosoph kann als der Vater der Logik angesehen werden. (Kant, 442.30)
Again on the other hand, Heidegger raises an historicism critique wherein supposèd immortal propositions have a demonstratedly human nativity. Kant, however, stoops to a critique of connoissance 1), abjuring the nakèd Schulweisheit and obtrusive subtelty of Aristotle, while praising his unparagoned thoroughness in establishing the moments of man's thinking ὄÏγανον (organon).

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1) sic; see 1762–71 H. Walpole Vertue's Anecd. Paint. (1786) IV. 33 "Being in search of a proper term for this science, Mr. Prior proposed to name it connoissance; but that word has not obtained possession as connoisseur has." (OED)

Kant, Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logic 2. Frankfurt, 1996.

 
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Kant, Logik:
Nun kamen die Wissenschaften in Okzident wieder empor und insbesondere das Ansehen des Aristoteles, die man aber auf eine Sklavische Weise folgte. (Kant, 455.20)
Thus the propædeutic interest in Kant's connoisseur-critique of Aristotle (s. supra); indeed that is the capital moment of logic's lore 1):
Als eine Wissenschaft [...] ist die Logik [...] als die Propädeutik alles Verstandesgebrauchs anzusehen. (Kant, 434.10)
Namely that subtle discount amongst lerers 2) which servers foremost to inflame scholars' mood 3) unto that Å’dipal savagery of relentless self-practice and the piety of a well-wrought, authentic thinking-gang 4):
Der wahre Philosoph muß also als Selbstdenker einen freien und selbsteigenen, keinen sklavisch nachahmenden Gebrauch von seiner Vernunft machen.
It would be meet in passing to note the continuity of Kant's project of Aufklärung, as stated in the incipit to the Berlinischer Monatsschrift, Dezember 1784, S. 481-494:
Aufklärung ist der Ausgang eines Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit. (Kant, XI.53)

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1) lore n.1, OHG. lêra (MHG. lêre, G. lehre); c1420 Lydg. Assembly of Gods 2074 Walke ye the way of Vertu hys loore. (OED)

2) a1300 Cursor M. 21179 Spellers o trouth, lerers o lede. (OED)

3) (MLG. muot, mod.G. mut) 1579 Fenton Guicciard. xiii. (1599) 604 Not weighing in their glorious moodes, how farre the daunger exceeded the attempt. (OED)

4) gang n.1 OHG. gang (MHG., mod.G. gang) a1300 Cursor M. 24000 O wijttes all me wantid might, Gang, and steyuen, and tung, and sight, All failled me þat tide. (OED)

Kant, Schriften zur Anthrolopologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 2. Frankfurt, 2002.

 
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Seine [Aristoteles] Lehrart ist sehr scholastisch, [...] wovon man indessen keinen Nutzen hat, weil fast alles auf bloße Subtilitäten hinausläuft. (Kant, 443.5)
Kant is in a better position to furnish forth an explanation for the so-called critique of connoissance.  Subtility, namely, is one of those desirèd goods of which, while serving indirectly the end of science' popularization:
Viele tadeln alle Subtilität, weil sie sie nicht erreichen können, (Kant, 482.25)
science cannot serve itself so much, where rather a discretio in subtilitate must lord.  The misuse of subtility provokes a negative libido 1) in the invidious spectator, itself being nonetheless libido; and libido furthermore the ground of popularity.  Thus expounds Kant the doctrine of discreet subtelty:
Aber sie macht an sich immer dem Verstande Ehre und ist sogar verdienstlich und notwendig, so fern sie auf einen der Beobachtung würdigen Gegenstand angewandt wird. (Kant, 482.30)
Aristotle, however, insofar as he be the "Vater der Logik" (442.30), would seem to have bestood the proof of the worthy object.  His fault lie therefore not in the object of his subtilizing libido (libido anÄlis) but in the overmeasure of the same, wherewith he hath outmatched the boundaries of useful inquiry:
Wenn man aber einer geringern Aufmerksamkeit und Anstrengung des Verstandes denselben Zweck hätte erreichen können [...] so macht man unnützen Aufwand und verfällt in Subtilitäten [...]. (Kant, 482.35)

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1) Over-springing modern psychologisms, libido should be heard Latinly, that is, in the sense of a) an incontinent letting-o'ermaster of discretion's manly faculty, namely in the foreign (ἀλλότÏιος / allotrios) domination of one's several will; and b) a resultant indeterminacy (emasculation) in the catheses of libidinal objects.  Confer the tropoi in i) L. Licinius Crassus, 25: "ubi libido dominatur, innocentiae leue praesidium est;" and ii) Marcus Tullius Cicero, de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 1.19: "ipsa declinatio ad libidinem fingitur."

 
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Wir haben allerdings Grund, [...] daß wir die Alten zu Schatzmeistern der Erkenntnisse und Wissenschaften machen, den relativen Wert ihrer Schriften zu einem absoluten erheben und ihrer Leitung uns blindings anvertrauen. (Kant, 509.35)
It's interesting that Heidegger wrestled with a similar albeit contrapositive problem, namely restoring credibility to the Ancients that their dixit might have an immediate resonance with the actual.  A counter-measure must be however in place, whereby self-training upon the Antique in the service of one's own understanding doesn't capitulate to an adolescent palæolatry: the worship ipso facto of what is ancient.

And yet there may be observed in Heidegger a peculiar tendency to the palæolatrous.  Positive reverence, on the other hand, stops not merely to behold and be astonishèd, but works forth even in the comradship and teleophily of a self-practice in the signifiers of man, annihilates these, and builds thereafter upon the foundation of native signifier.

Generosity bids us speculate that Heidegger acted from a position of violent piety when he established at the outset of §2:
1. Vorassetzung: daß gerade Aristoteles überhaupt etwas zu sagen hat, [...] daß ihm also eine ausgezeichnete Stelle nich nur innerhalb der griechischen, sondern der gesamten abenländischen Philosophie zukommt;" (5.25)
i.e., that a palpable reverence has not emasculated his critical faculties with an unfruitful, mimetic palæolatry.  This has freely yet to be established.

 
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I wondered where the reference to the
Anthropologie came from, and whether there's
some relation between it and the questions of
Kant's relation to Aristotle and the logicicans,
which you discuss.

Kant, _Schriften zur Anthrolopologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 2_. Frankfurt, 2002.

[/QUOTE]
 
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Originally posted by Charley_McTaggert:
I wondered where the reference to the
Anthropologie came from [...].

Fascinating.  The Anthropologie was chosen for a collection of pieces sharing a relatively narrow time span, including the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) and the Logik (1800) itself, which incidently belong to some of Kant's most candid and liberal writing.  Herein, Kant gives us a taste of the unparagoned connoisseur and, as Heidegger points out,
"Kant ist der einzige, der die Logik lebendig werden läßt." (Grundbegriffe, 10)

Best,
Peter
 
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Which Kant edition are you using? Was there a new version of the Suhrkamp in 2002?

When/by whom were the Logik and the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht grouped? I've been working off the Suhrkamp rather than the Akademie Ausgabe, so I'm not sure what they do.
 
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Hmmm; that should correspond to Bds. XI and XII of the 1968 Suhrkamp. What do you have in lieu of this?

Peter
 
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I have a photo-identical reproduction of the '68 Suhrkamp. Metaphysik und Logik are 5 & 6, and the Anthropologie is 11 & 12.

I'm interested in the idea of grouping the Logik and the Anthropologie: who made the editorial decision, on what criteria, has it been generally accepted.
 
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Hmm; although the editor's description is fairly laconic, I'd imagine his method is partly negative, i.e. none of the essays warrants its own volume; and positive, they belong to the same general time frame.  On the temporal criterion see for instance page 815, Bd. XII:
Die vorliegenden Bände [...] fassen dessen Schriften [...] in chronologischer Reihenfolge zusammen.
What strikes you as particularly uncanny?

Best,
Peter
 
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Originally posted on January 18, 2003:
The Anthropologie was chosen for a collection of pieces sharing a relatively narrow time span, including the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798) and the Logik (1800) itself.
The Logik, of course, belongs to a separate volume as posted above.  (Kant, Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik.)  Schriften zur Anthrolopologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik was brought in on account of Mündigkeit; and no editorial decision has brought them any closer, I believe, than the formality of having been penned by the same author.

Best,
Peter
 
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"Der begriff geht darauf hinaus, zu antworten auf die Frage, was der Gegenstand ist." (Heidegger, Grundbegriffe, 11.10)
"Was" in this context is less the object's quid than its usus.  The implicit metathesis of "what x is" to "how x is used" is indirectly prepared for by Kant's Logik, which establishes that to every Erkenntis belongs material and form, the latter being "die Art, wie wir den Gegenstand erkennen." (Einleitung V, 457)  Compare the Greeks' conception of material which, according to Sein und Zeit, had achieved a union of quid and usus as an immediate composite:
"Die griechen hatten einen angemessenen Terminus für die »Dinge«: πράγματα [pragmata], d.i. das, womit man es im besorgenden Umgang (πρᾶξις [praxis]) zu tun hat." (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, §15, 68)
    It's not until much later at the end of the Logik that Kant formally distills an object's Nominal- und Real-definition; whose moments correspond to the Anschauung and Begriff of material and form, insofar as the Nominaldefinition serves to distinguish one object from the next and the Realdefinition, on the other hand, "zur Erkenntis der Sache ihrer innern Möglichkeit nach." (Kant, Logik, §106).  The approfoundment of a res according to her "inner possibilities" implies not only distinguishment in a given system from other res, but also fitness for a particular purpose.
    Over and above Kant's characterisation of the Nominal und Real-definition, Heidegger's text goes so far to assert that "er [Kant] die Grundregel der definitio so bestimmt, daß sie nicht in Frage kommt für die eigentliche Definition." (Heidegger, Grundbegriffe, 12.10)  The conflation of Realdefinition with eigentliche Definition, however, rests upon the indicativity of the real to assert the preference or authority of the real.  Although indeed res signified classically the substantive over against the chimerical,
"haec res agitur nobis, uobis fabula;" (Plautus, Captiui, 52)
it also stretched to include abstract collectives:
"aurum, argentum, collum [...] tris res nunc debes semul." (Plautus, Poenulus, 1401)
    The preferment or authority of the res as the most legitimate is therefore philosophically presumptuous and philologically unfounded; the characterisation, moreover, is first Kant's:
"Unter bloßen Namen-erklärungen [...] sind diejenigen zu verstehen, [...] die daher nur das logische Wesen ihres Gegenstandes bezeichnen [...]." (Kant, Logik, §106)
Through the bridling language of disparagement and privation it would relegate the determination by name to the less-than-legitimate.  The usus of Begriff, or that more legitimate moiety of Erkenntnis over against the quid of Anschauung, whose distinguishment was not yet acknowledged in πρᾶγμα[pragma], is the gambit upon whose sacrifice Heidegger will proceed as 'twere retro-progressively to Aristotle.  From the Handschrift:
"Umgang im Seienden, Sein mit seienedem im Charakter des Da–Dasein.  Aristoteles [hat] kein Wort für 'Begriff'." (Heidegger, Grundbegriffe, 337.2)
Behold in this latest language the adumbration of Sein und Zeit's immanent approach.

 
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Thanks for posting the Kant passage on the distinction between Real- and Nominaldefintionen.
I'm not sure I see the connection between the Kantian distinction and Heidegger's use of usus though.

I'm working on Kant's discussion of modality in the Deductions (if anyone has any suggestions for good literature on the subject, I'd appreciate it...)

What I found particularly interesting in the quote from the Logik is this idea that the "inner possibilities" of a Sache could lead to an Erkenntnis...I wonder what these inner possibilities (distinguished from their relations with other objects) would amount to. Would they be given by the presentation of objects in terms of both the categories and the forms of Anschauung?

Best,

Charley
 
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