Politics of Bodies and Spaces, Huib Ernste (2005-02-01 01:17:39): Call for papers, Conference/Workshop, Radboud University Nijmegen, June, 17-18, 2005: Politics of Bodies and Spaces featuring key-note speakers: Dr. Steve Pile Senior lecturer, Department of Geography, Open University. Milton Keynes, U.K. (Co-Author of: Nast, H. and Pile, S. (eds) (1998) Places through the Body. Routledge, London) Geographies of Skin: identity, memory and the world outside in [/B] Prof. dr. Martina Löw Department of Sociology, Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany (Author of: Löw, M. (2001) Raumsoziologie [Sociology of Space]. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main) [B]The Social Construction of Gendered Space: The beach, the gaze and the somatisation of social order and four workshops on: 1. Geopolitics of Discipline and Control 2. The Body Politics of Subjectivity 3. Sporting Bodies and Spaces 4. Re-Enchanting Bodies or Where the Wild Things Are See for further details: www.ru.nl/socgeo/Workshop ...
Machenschaft, alex (2005-01-27 04:05:02): Hallo dear readers, I wonder if there can be made links concerning Machenschaft to our present time. Do you see any possible connection to the world today? The word Machenschaft was "made" by Heidegger in the years 30. This was the time of the rising nazism. So, our time of democracy is much different. But still there is a possibility of connections. I like to rad tou on this subject. I myself think, that there could be a pipeline view today, which is the same as in these years. Thanks for answering. Whish you all teh best by reading Heidegger, the deepest thinker of the last century....
question regarding Transcendental subjectivity and such. ( Being and Time related), Slightly Cornered Animal (2004-12-20 22:31:48): I don't quite understand the meaning of the transcendental subjectivity and it's relation to the emergence of the objectivity of objects....
Heidegger on "die Welt", Tarnhari (2004-12-11 11:13:38): Dear Everybody, I would most appreciate it if some of You enlightened people would answer the following question: Heidegger spoke of an In-der-Welt-sein. The "openness" in this state, that according to Heidegger underlies the understanding of existence, also concerns the "world" (Welt or Bedeutsamkeit). What are the limitations of this "world"? Is it to be understood as the totality of existence or could it have been meant as a "situation", perhaps a culture? --...
Question about 1920s spiritual context, beornot (2004-09-02 08:32:50): In Der Begriff der Zeit (1924), Heidegger wrote, "The present generation thinks it has found history, it thinks it is even overburdened with history. It moans about historicism - lucus a non lucendo ." (The Concept of Time, tr. W. McNeill, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, 20E). What did he mean by that remark? To which spiritual movements did he refer? What was that "historicism" and who were those that "moaned about" it, for what? Would anybody here give some information about the spiritual context of that time? Thanx! btw. what does the latin lucus a non lucendo mean?...
transition from ready-to-hand to present-to-hand, Thelema (2004-07-26 07:37:20): Ive been pondering this question for many years now after my initial Heidegger readings, and I am still no closer to a resolution. Deep analysis of the question as to whether this transition is analogue or binary seems to engage multiple streams of topics, from quantum physical "disentanglement" to the nature of time as processed by the human brain. Is there some sort of consensus as to whether Heidegger himself thought the transition to be binary or analogue? What other types of things in the world are binary?...
my student -Sercan Başdoğan- is:own Heideggerian meditation!, ottomanic-dasein (2004-07-07 09:17:31): " Zu Existieren aber von keinem Wesen nicht gesehen zu werden ist eins von den schmerzvollsten prozessen." Wie so ich diesen satz gesagt habe ist dass ein ereignis kam auf mir im Meer. Und half mir die Wahrheit zu sehen. Es war jahr 2002 im Sommer, ich befand mich in Özdere. İch trainierte jeden tag, zwischen 15.00 und 16.00 Uhr als die Sonne seine wirkung auf die Haut verlor, schwamm ich parallel vor dem Strand im Meer. Die tiefe ist 8 meter und als distanz schwamm ich circa 150 meter. Und dass tat ich mindestes vier mal. İch schaute es als ein training an. Mit der gierichkeit des Willen wollte ich schneller schwimmen, gab mehr schub und ich bekam einen krampf ins rechte unterschenkel in der letzten stecke. İch hatte mehrere davon. Aber dieser schmerz zeigte sich mit allem was er hat. Mein gekrampfter Bein zog mich hinunter ins Meer. Angst und Panik war vorhand. İch rief nach Hilfe an den Strand. Aber es half nichts, alles was nahe ist, ist jetzt sehr weit von mir. İch verlor langsam meine hoffnung und werde still. İch wartete bis mein Bein von sich selbst lockert. Um 20.45 Uhr war der krampf weg aber auch mein bewusstsein war fort. Über 5 stunden war ich ganz allein im Meer und zapperte mit meinen Armen damit das Meer mich nicht hinaus trieb. İch war gerettet. Aber in dieser Periode, hatte ich mich von dem Meers umwandlung gerettet? an die frage kam als Antwort ein "Nein". İch wachte jeden tag in Scheiss auf mit der wirkung der Hitze und hatte Alptraume in den Tagen. Es sind zwei jahren vorgegangen von den umwandlung und ich began es noch neu zu begreifen. Jetzt begreife ich wie so ich so ein Leben habe weil dieses ereignis mir was in meinem inneren hinterliess. Das Meer und İch, ich sehe jeden aber "alle"s was sich um mich befand, hat mich von ihrer Realititat weg geworfen und ihren Leben fortgesetzt. İch fall ins Zweifel ob ich hier bin oder nicht bin? İch bin nicht hier al...
The Ister - film based on Heidegger's 1942 Hoelderlin lectures, ister (2004-06-15 05:27:55): THE ISTER A film by David Barison and Daniel Ross - www.theister.com (screenings information below) Based on Martin Heidegger's 1942 Hoelderlin lectures For those interested in Hediegger's thought, 'The Ister' is a film unlike any other. It is not only about philosophy, but pursues a path of questioning that is at the same time philosophical and cinematic. The point of departure for the film is a lecture course delivered by Martin Heidegger in 1942. The course took the form of an extended meditation on one poem by Friedrich Hoelderlin, "Der Ister," another name for the Danube River. Delivered in the depths of the Second World War, the lecture course is not only a remarkable example of Heidegger's philosophical interpretation of Hoelderlin's poetry. It is also an examination of themes such as place, art, technology, and politics. 'The Ister' begins at the Black Sea, moving upstream along the Danube to its source in the Black Forest. As such, the film journeys in the direction of the historial flow of the Danube westwards, in line with Heidegger’s reading of Hoelderlin. At the same time, 'The Ister' offers an opportunity for a series of extended interviews with the philosophers Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Bernard Stiegler, as well as the filmmaker and artist, Hans-Juergen Syberberg. Stiegler begins with an account of the history of humanity as a technical being, from prehistoric times until today. Nancy discusses man insofar as he is a political being. Lacoue-Labarthe thinks through the meaning of Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism, in a candid interview in which he questions his own previous writings on this matter. For anyone interested in Heidegger or philosophy generally, or for anyone simply puzzled by the world in which we live today, 'The Ister' is a unique cinematic achievement that demands to be seen. Please contact David Barison (davidbariso...
Spinoza (and the 'shame on thinking'), mcdonald928 (2004-05-30 16:02:55): Although Spinoza is the philosopher of substance par excellence (a notion which, in it's contemporary scientistic sense is one of Heidegger's targets for destructuring), he and Heidegger seem to share a great affinity (along with Parminides) in their radical emphasis on (constant re-turning to) Being as prior to the thought of beings in particular and the thought of not being. For both of them, body and mind are better understood as embodiment. Where they diverge is in the question of metaphysics. For Spinoza is a perfectly unabashed thinker of 'first things' and their reason for being (what he calls "adequate ideas" are not representations, but are the unique expressions of the things themselves), indeed this is what he felt was called for in his own time. For Spinoza it is obvious that the disciplined practice of reasoning leads inevitably to the conclusion that the natural universe (the idea of 'being as a whole') finds it's cause 'in and of itself'. And man's only 'freedom' is therefore to overcome his particular natural limits by understanding their necessity within the scheme of differentiating itself (being 'thrown' indifferently by it's own necessity - indeed it should be said that even God is 'thrown' into His Being Necessitated for Spinoza). Now one could point out, as Deleuze does, that Spinoza - because he writes before Heidegger - fails to address the ontological difference and privileges what seems to be a particular formulation of Being. Spinoza speaks of the one substance which underlies the infinity of attributes (different modes of being) making up the natural universe as itself an individual being. But in fact, he does warn of a 'problem' with the thinking of "God or Nature" as 'one thing' - he says numbers are a thing of mankind's reason and not inherent to the thing itself.. but this begs the question. And a question may arise here of whether Heidegger shared a certain w...
Heidegger on Medieval Philosophy, pedro (2004-05-19 10:22:55): Hello! I'm new in this forum. I'm really surprised about how much material on Heidegger is available on the web. From a long time I've been a reader on Heidegger' works, but my investigation is devoted to Middle Age Philosophy (12th Century). Could any of you, please, point to an article where Middle Age Philosophy is quote in relation with Heidegger's philosophy? Thanks a lot and congratulations about this forum!...
The Origin of Art&Destination of Thinking, ottomanic-dasein (2004-04-25 08:13:19): Nowadays, of M.Heidegger 'Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denken' Denkerfah Denkerfahrungen rungen :1910-1976 in turkish trans.Leyla Baydar&H.Ü Nalbantoglu (into Patikalar Nisan 1997), I am not able to solve some the relavent of the concept: Anwesenheit ... Do y have on some knowledge on the text?...
Heidegger Conference Announcement, Peter Danenberg (2004-04-06 10:30:54): AUSSPRACHE ZU HEIDEGGER Dritte Internationale Aussprache zu Martin Heidegger vom 3. bis 6. Juni 2004 Bergische Universität Wuppertal Third International Dialogue addressing Martin Heidegger's Thought / June 3-6, 2004 / University of Wuppertal Conference Webpage: http://homepages.utoledo.edu/enelson5/aussprache3.htm For further information, contact: PD Dr. Peter Trawny (Bergische Universität Wuppertal) PeterTrawny@aol.com Dr. Eric Sean Nelson (University of Toledo) eric.nelson@utoledo.edu...
On the Law of Insignificance, Mike Szymczyk (2003-12-14 00:21:20): Hey, if anyones bored I'm attaching and pasting underneath the first part of an essay (or book, who knows yet) that I am working on (the last part, 'clarifications' is still unfinished). I'd recommend reading the attached version on Microsoft Word. I'd welcome any comments anyone may have to help me improve it. Sincerely, Mike Szymczyk On the Law of Insignificance Michael James Szymczyk “Take my advice, come away with me now! Inasmuch as the earthly Lot of all creatures that live is a mortal one, leaving no way past Death for the great or the small, the conclusion, dear fellow, is surely This: live in happiness, while there is time, under pleasant conditions; Bear in mind always how brief is your span of existence� -Horace (2.6. Satires) Introduction The present work is not without difficulty. One may have to read it twice. Whether there is a reward at the end for the industry and patience of the reader I cannot say. My only hope here is to establish the precondition of all philosophy (significance), to go beyond the hopes and prejudices of philosophy and philosophers (which debilitate us all) and to touch what I can with open eyes and open ears on such a delicate subject as this. I ask only that what I may pass on to the reader he or she handles with thought and care so that it does not fall to the floor and shatter, however, if by overwhelming consent my thoughts are construed as worthless then I ask the philosophical community to gather up the broomstick and to accept my sincerest apologies at my own poor lack of judgment, most of all concerning the authenticity of my own thoughts. The central tenet of this essay is the act of giving significance and from whence that act originates and to what reality that act has in relation to the variable of time. The content of this essay is of a descriptive nature. It describes the state of consci...
The Wanderer's mitdasein (OE Style), Pharmakon (2003-12-13 20:16:39): I'm currently working on a paper that uses the Heideggarian structure of mitdasein to problematize an investigation into the wanderer's exile. The poem is a short (only 115 lines) elegiac lament for the (pagan) wanderer's loss of his lord and kin, but a (christian) narrator is also a (relatively minor) character. Any investigation would have to take the Old English tradition of Comitatus into consideration. Any Suggestions? ...
I need some questions answered, Kim (2003-11-19 12:16:51): According to Heidegger, what causes guilt what is the threefold structure of Dasein What does the event of death reveal to humans about themselves Thanks!!!!...
Denazification tribunal transcripts on Heidegger 1945-46, Wayne Perry (2003-11-09 13:26:00): Is it possible to obtain this as I am writing a play What is IS ? with heidegger/arrendt and celan as the protagonists.Can you help? Many thanks Dr Wayne Perry...
phusikês akroaseôs a.1 184a10, Peter Danenberg (2003-10-29 14:50:16): T. Horstschäfer describes well what the literature considers to be an apparent inconsistency in Aristotle's method between the Physics and the later Analytics, when his Å“uvre is fastened upon as a coherent whole: [...] daß das Buch A der Physik als wissenschaftliche Einzeluntersuchung, die von den konkreten Naturdingen ausgeht, um zu deren Prinzipien zu gelangen, im Widerspruch zu der in den Analytica posteriora geforderten Methodologie einer apodeiktischen Wissenschaft steht, die umgekehrt von den Prinzipien ausgeht, um aus ihnen die einzenen Dinge herzuleiten. (Horstschäfer, 1998: 7.1) Indeed. And in conjunction with the catechism of scientific progression, which starts from an incoherent whole; the defective clarity of quotidian understanding ( ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον, 184α21 ) furnishes forth a not altogether fortuitous anticipation of Sein und Zeit 's self-described μέθοδος : Als suchen bedarf das Fragen einer vorgängigen Leitung vom Gesuchten her. Der Sinn von Sein muß uns daher schon in gewisser Weise verfügbar sein. Angedeutet wurde: wir bewegen uns immer schon in einem Seinsverständnis. (Heidegger, 1993: 5) The situation of understanding nōtioribus prōgrediendō ( πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφP...
tôn meta ta phusika z.5 1028b33, Peter Danenberg (2003-10-14 17:39:00): Establishes the four-fold of οὐσία , that it is severally τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι , τὸ καθόλου , τὸ γένος and τὸ ὑποκείμενον ; length, breadth, depth and other reducible qualities ( ποσότητες 1029a14) not contributing to οὐσία . τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι : the persistence of thing which “ is and always has been the same” (s. Liddell, εἰμί F.1); τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι draws upon the imperfect tense as the fusion of an indefinite past with a persistent currency: “Das griechische (und schon das spätindogermanische) Imperfekt versetzt den Verbalinhalt des Präsensstammes, zu dem es gehört, in die Vergangenheit.” (Schwyzer, II.275) (1) It may well represent an iterative veracity : the abstraction from the set of all cases x , the extrapolation of the same; an inductive. Confer Herodotos 4.64: δέρμα δὲ ἀνθρώπου καὶ παχὺ καὶ λαμπρὸν ἦν ἄρα, σχεδὸν δερμάτων πάντων λαμπρότατον λευκότητι. τὸ καθόλου : Gestalt according to whole, opposed to its parts taken sunderly. τὸ γέ...
Bin ich wenn ich nicht denke????, binichwennichnicht (2003-09-12 04:34:25): Was denkt Ihr über das "Werk" von R.Linde, in dem er sich mit Heidegger "auseinandersetzt" ?! siehe reinhard" TARGET=_blank>www.reinhard.linde.de.vu[URL=http://www.reinhard.linde.de.vu]reinhard linde ...
Heidegger and The Romans, Dheeraj Chand (2003-08-28 23:17:08): Dear scholars, I am very curious about Heidegger's relationship to the various Roman thinkers, particularly Philodemus and Cicero. Are there any publications in which he explicitly discusses them and their significance to Philosophy? Please feel free to email me, disciplineandpunish@mail.utexas.edu Thanks, -dx "Sum Platonicus." - M.T. Cicero, "De Republica"...
Question Concerning Reason Qua Communication, mcdonald928 (2003-08-18 12:27:22): I would like to initiate a disucssion around the question of Jurgen Habermas' work as it relates to Heidegger, i.e.; how strong an influence do you believe Heidegger's work has been on Habermas? on the Frankfurt School in general? What do you make of Habermas' hermeneutic critique of Heidegger in his "The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity"? Does Habermas improve the Heideggerian, hermeneutical trend in contemporary Continental philosophy with his rehabilitated sense of reason as communicative action , requiring hearing by an other, as opposed to the instrumental/tautological or monological use of reason. This approach is still quite different from the more radical critique of reason by such as Rorty and Derrida. It is my opinion that of all contemporary philosophical writers, Habermas has developed the best 'new synthesis' of Heidegger's insights by blending them with a rehabilitated conception of reason (reason understood primarily as communicative action) for the purpose of mounting more effective challenges to the narrow-minded forces of scientistic, rigidly procedural, ahistorical, etc. modes of thinking. For those not familiar with Habermas, an excellent introduction, with plenty of the Heideggerian influence in evidence, is "On Habermas" by Leslie Howe from the Wadsworth Philosophers Series: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0534576214/qid=1061232697/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/102-1145258-2385758?v=glance&s=books There is also an essay, which I have not read yet, which should be highly relevant to this question titled "Heidegger, Habermas, and the Mobile Phone". It has been published in both of these books: "The End of Everything: Postmodernism and the Vanishing of the Human" http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1840464216/qid=1061234371/sr=2-1/ref=sr_2_1/102-1145258-2385758 "Heidegger, Habermas and the Mobile Phone (Postmodern Encounters Series)" http://www.amazon.co...
Table of Contents to Lectures, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-06-22 03:40:58): Contributions to a Phenomenology of Manliness Michael Eldred Table of Contents Lecture 1 Plato's thinking on manliness Lecture 2 World comes to stand in the light of understanding Lecture 3 The stand taken by understanding against desire Lecture 4 Manliness as an alliance with understanding to control passion Lecture 5 Recapitulation and summary The striving of human being Lecture 6 First person being and second person being Striving for esteem Lecture 7 Truth in the second person: showing-off Whoness vs. whatness Lecture 8 Calling and naming: bearing a proper name Being held to be: reputation Lecture 9 Reputation and vocation Lecture 10 Persona and encounter with the world as uplifting or downcasting Lecture 11 Standing as who endangered Standing as who in a vertical dimension Lecture 12 Weighty words of authority Discrepancy between social standing and ability Lecture 13 Falsity of whoness Pride and vanity Lecture 14 Flattery Aristotle on flattery in the Rhetoric Plato on flattery in Gorgias Lecture 15 Mutual eyeing of status as who: covert hostility Lecture 16 A genuine stance within oneself in one's abilities Lecture 17 Ethical stances as practised, habituated competence ...
Lecture 24, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-06-22 03:38:34): Lecture 24 Through the interstice of intimacy, your words co-shape who I am, just as my words co-shape who you are. To be who I am in the world, I depend on the assurance you give in certain rare moments of intimacy in which you-and-I eventuates into barely present nonetheless presence. In reciprocally contributing to defining who each of us is, each of our words has the potential to either strengthen or weaken our own self-understanding and stand in the world. Loving care and concern for each other in self-casting thus tends to oscillate with the possibility of annihilating hate. Such annihilation relates to the stand assumed as who in the world and the oscillation between love and hate as perpetual possibility derives from the unstanding, unstable nature of our between, which takes place next to the well-defined being of standing presence. The intimacy of you-and-me in between gives each of our words a defining weight and power of casting the other. Such power is reciprocal and can turn, either intermittently or lastingly, into the annihilating power of hate. In leaning toward each other in love out of our respective, independent self-stands in the standing presence of whoness, each of us risks the power of the other to co-cast who each of us is. Love different from esteem: standing and barely standing presence The intimacy of love, enfolded in the interstice of the between of you-and-me, is thus ontologically different from the mutual recognition and appreciation possible in esteem accorded and received. In esteem, the look of who one is as presented to the world is appreciated and held in regard by the other. My abilities and self-definition gain recognition in the eyes of others. The intimacy of you-and-me, however, is to be conceived ontologically from our mooded co-sharing of world in which we affect each other affectively. We are expose...
Lecture 23, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-06-15 04:11:00): Lecture 23 Momentary exchange of glances in the scarce presence of you and me The exchange of glances in the moment between those who love each other (here not in the sexual sense of bodily desire for each other) is a subtle, fleeting kind of worldsharing very different from communication by means of language through which worldsharing gains definition. The momentary exchange of glances is an indefinite disclosure to each other which says perhaps something like 'I am there with you' or 'We are here together in the opening of this present moment'. The phrase 'perhaps something like' is no accident in such a context, for here we are dealing with indefinite, nebulous phenomena that elude further definition and can only be surmised. The exchange of glances is an impossible momentary union, for you and I each remains an individual human being, forever ontologically separated from each other and yet, as human beings, also forever ontologically together in a sharing of world. The reading of the exchange of glances remains surmise and guesswork and is, above all, a mooded exchange coloured by a certain mood of the moment. "There was a delightful interchange of influence in their eyes, and what they said had that superfluity of meaning for them, which is observable with some sense of flatness by a third person. ... Even the points it [the gossamer web of young love-making] clings to — the things whence its subtle interlacings are scarcely perceptible ; momentary touches of finger-tips, meetings of rays from blue and dark orbs, unfinished phrases, lightest changes of cheek and lip, faintest tremors." (George Eliot Middlemarch Chaps. 27, 36 emphases added) The loving exchange of glances can be distinguished from a hostile exchange of glances. The look in the other's eyes can differ and thus be read differently as perhaps a different mood and a...
Lecture 22, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-06-09 02:39:30): Lecture 22 What does the phenomenon of hugging reveal? Hugging is a way of sharing the world in an emotive way through bodily contact. The bodily contact only makes sense because emotions, feelings, moods are somatically anchored. An embrace signals a caring, perhaps even protective, inclination toward the other in their world-situation which is felt immediately in an emotive-bodily sense. Physical touch, as Aristotle says, is the most primitive of sense perceptions ( ai)/sqhsij ) shared by all animal life. It is primitive or 'first' in the sense of taking in the world sensuously in the simplest way, through touch, i.e. through direct contiguity of being and being. Physical touch and being moved emotively by an encounter with the world are so closely related because emotion or mood itself involves the body in the mode of openness to the world signified by moodedness. When friends embrace, through the physical contact they experience each other's mooded being-in-the-world immediately in a bodily, and thus mooded, way. Thus an embrace is more than just a sign of affection and liking, but is also a way of bodily co-involvement with the world and thus supports a shared mood in the closest, most immediate sense possible. Liking or affection for each other means being co-affected by mooded exposure to the world, and such co-affection is experienced bodily in an hug. Such inclination as shown in liking is the opposite to the concern with one's own self-stand as somewho in the shared social world which is expressed in phenomena such as covert hostility which we have already discussed. Concern with one's own standing in the social world implies drawing a self-defining line of demarcation vis-à-vis the movement of the other's moodedness and thus also an indifference and non-attunement to the other's world situation. Dislike for the other is an even stronger disinclination ...
Lecture 21, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-06-01 03:53:19): Lecture 21 Empathy is usually connoted as a positive human quality, say, of " self -involvement-with- others " or, more fundamentally, "as a primal mode of dwelling or attunement with the social world, as a capacity for ekstatic being in/there/with others with respect to existential weal and woe" (Lawrence Hatab Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2000 p. 148). In an even more fundamental ontological-existential sense, empathy (which is originally a translation of German Einfühlung ) signifies no more and no less than the shared mooded openness of human being to the world and thus a characteristic of human being which is quite neutral and which encompasses also all deficient modes of empathy such as indifference and insensitivity. The word 'empathy' itself is not a happy choice of terminology. In the first place, as a translation of German Einfühlung , it connotes a feeling-into of one subject into another as if both subjects were each enclosed in themselves and each could feel over into the other. Such an ontological conception oversees the ekstatic structure of human being which is always already a standing-out into the world. This ex-posure to the world is always already moodful and these moods not only can be shared — it is ineluctable for human being to share the world with others without also sharing in some way or other their mooded openness to the world. In the second place, 'empathy' is derived from Gk. e)mpa/qhj which signifies 'strongly moved by emotion' and thus describes a state in which one is in ( e)m- ) a strong emotion ( pa/qoj ). This strong state of emotion may not have anything to do with anyone else's mood. Etymologically, a better choice of term would be 'sympathy' which means literally a 'feeling-with', a shared emotion in being mov...
Heidegger & Mathematics, bekir (2003-05-25 01:57:19): Hello, Can any one tell me any article that discusses Heidegger's ideas on mathematics? Thanks, Bekir...
Lecture 20, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-05-22 03:11:39): Lecture 20 Good living outside standing presence? Let that be enough on friendship as thought by Aristotle against the background of a fundamental understanding of being as standing presence. It remains to ask whether the phenomenon of friendship also reveals aspects which cannot be so conceived. What is the other of standing presence with regard to friendship and a successful, flourishing life? As Aristotle himself points out (1095b33, 1099a2), the capabilities of someone who is asleep are not at work, so that they also cannot be said to attain the end of the good life. Sleeping is the opposite of the workings of the soul in accordance with its abilities. The capable man must bring himself to a stand in life by practising and developing his abilities to accomplished excellence. This is daily work which involves pulling oneself together and coming to a stand every day out of the lethargy of sleep. Who I am has to be reconstructed each morning on rising and unwound each evening on going to bed. On waking, I recall who I was the previous night on going to sleep, and in this re-calling come to stand gradually in a new day. The business of the new day also calls me to stand in collecting and re-collecting my abilities. Those who succeed in habitually bringing themselves to a stand in the practices of everyday life appreciate each other's habitually practised and attained abilities and accomplishments. This is the liking between good friends. But, quite apart from differing phases of life, what of those moments in which one is not in top form, not at the height of one's powers, not at the peak of one's abilities, not up to it, out of sorts? The phenomena of sleep and sleepiness, of tiredness and weariness indicate already that the practising of the working soul in accordance with its capabilities is a temporally defined phenomenon which, moreover, a...
Lecture 19, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-05-15 02:30:13): Lecture 19 I appreciate a useful friend primarily for his usefulness for me and only secondarily or indirectly for any quality he may have in himself (e.g. his professionalism is useful to me). This has a parallel in the phenomenon of esteem which is a good accorded by others which therefore, as previously mentioned, can just as easily be taken away by them because the esteem does not reside intrinsically in the individual esteemed as his own (1095b25). In esteeming me, a friend is useful to me. Aristotle names two ends of practical life in the polis: esteem and money, which have the status of goods for a good life. If the end of practical social life is to be held in high regard by others and to enter friendships that are useful to this end or the end of making money (1096a6), the man who pursues such a life comes to a stand that is upheld by others or is pursuing an end which is endless in the sense that it can never come to final completion. These deficiencies are to be overcome in a life which is a practical working of the soul in accordance with its abilities and excellences (1102a5, 1098a17) and in which friendships are based on the well-wishing for each other's accomplished excellence. Telei/a d" e)stin h( tw=n a)gaqw=n fili/a kai\ kat" a)reth\n. ou(=toi ga\r ta)gaqa\ o(moi/wj bou/lontai a)llh/loij, $(= a)gaqoi/, a)gaqoi\ d" ei)si kaq" au(tou/j: (1156b7) The perfect friendship [which has come to an end or final state to which nothing further could be added] is that between the good in the sense of those who are similar according to their excellence, for such friends want for each other alike the good insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves. Such friends who are good in themselves according to the excellence they have achieved through work ( e)ne/rgeia ) have a stand in themselves and they like each other not becaus...
Lecture 18, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-05-08 03:30:55): Lecture 18 Nor can human being aim to hit the mean by adopting a rigid stance, thus participating in 'eternal' ( a)ei/ ) standing presence in a mode of quasi-eternal rigidity. Rather, the standing presence to be aimed for and achieved by manly human being is that stance adopted and attained through practice, repetition, habituation, i.e. "from practising many times" ( e)k tou= polla/kij pra/ttein 1105b4 cf. GA18:191). Because human being is essentially temporal and thus situated in the world in the temporality of its specific, continually changing situations, such an habituated stance cannot be rigid, but has to adapt appropriately to each given situation and grasp the concrete moment as a 'growing together' (concrescere) of all the various aspects to be considered in a given situation. Thus, for instance, a man becomes manly in his stance by repeatedly being exposed to dangerous situations in his shared life with others, thus learning courage and how to appropriately regulate his anger to ward off danger from others. There is no general norm for how to behave in a manly, courageous way, and an appropriate manly stance has to gain definition concretely in each given situation. Finding the appropriate mean in a specific given situation is difficult and it is very easy to miss it. It is easy to get angry, but it is difficult to get angry at the right moment in a situation under the guidance of an insightful assessment of the entire situation in all its aspects. Manliness as one of the leading practised abilities characterizing human being as it comes to stand in the world is a "composed stance which sees" ( e(/cij ble/pousa 1106b9) in such a way that anger as a kind of conduct is unleashed at the appropriate moment. In being exposed to the world, human existence is continually buffeted by its encounters with the world in the uplifting or downcasting ...
Lecture 17, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-05-01 03:21:30): Lecture 17 How can the stance which someone adopts as who and shows off to others be genuine? If honour and esteem are not to depend entirely on the regard paid by others, but are to have a stand in themselves, there has to be something intrinsic or kaq" au(to/ in the who-stand instead of it being defined purely relationally or pro/j ti as that which is accorded by others, i.e. by those esteeming ( e)n t%= timwme/n% Eth. Nic . I v. 1095b25). Aristotle therefore says that an individual seeks to be regarded and esteemed by "those with insight" ( tw=n froni/mwn 1095b28) on the basis of their own ability and competence ( e)p" a)ret$= 1095b29), which is the individual's "own and hard to take away" ( oi)kei=o/n ti kai\ dusafai/reton 1095b26). The individual can only have a stand within itself insofar as it has ability, competence, excellence, such ability, competence and excellence only having their meaning against the background of the fundamental meaning of being as standing presence or, more precisely, as bringing-to-presence-in-a-stand. Only against this implicit background can Aristotle say that "the in-itself, i.e. standing presence, is prior to relation in the natural order of self-presencing" ( to\ de\ kaq" au(to\ kai\ h( ou)si/a pro/teron t$= fu/sei tou= pro/j ti 1096a22). Aristotle calls such ability, competence and excellence a)reth¯ , a term usually translated by the tradition as 'virtue'. But a)reth¯ applies to everything which someone is good at in the practical, shared life of the polis. It is not a moral quality. Nor is it an ideal, especially not for Aristotle. (The standard translations of Aristotle, with their invariably Christian-Platonic flavour, have still to be overcome.) A shoemaker has a)reth¯ by 'virtue' of making and being able to make good shoes. He is good at shoemaking. He posse...
Antwortlichkeit, scamp (2003-04-29 09:46:19): I am looking for the source of the German word in the subject line, recently found on an old archived note for a previous research project. I believe it is a Heideggarian construction, and translates as "able to heed the call of being." However, we no longer have any reference to the source, and would like to be able to complete the research in this area. Can anyone help?...
The third question: Geläut, greekplan (2003-04-22 08:10:00): "Die Sprache spricht als das Geläut der Stille."(GA12:Unterwegs zur Sprache ,Sprache) Most Chinese scholars translate the word of"Geläut " with a chinese word which means 'pure sound".There is another chinese translation of it which refers to a traditional musical instrument ofen used in european church(a special bell which could ring continually when struck?) I am confused between the two definitions and so it's hard for me to make clear the whole meaning of the above sentence. Please help me,thanks!...
Lecture 16, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-04-22 04:18:02): Lecture 16 On a less superficial level, the mutual eyeing and estimation of each other depends on the abilities that are put on display. The stand as who depends upon what the individual can bring forth into presence in the broadest sense under the guidance of skill and knowledge. A footballer, for instance, brings forth goals, a carpenter brings forth tables, a salesperson brings forth sales, a politician election victories, a teacher well-educated pupils, a scientist new scientific results of research, etc. All these achievements are poietic in the sense of her-stellend , i.e. bringing into a stand in presence, and they define also the stand which an individual assumes as who for itself and others. Because there is a striving on the part of individuals for esteem, and esteem is something accorded by others, the standing as who itself is never an absolute phenomenon, but one related to others. A stand as who is always essentially relative . This makes every encounter in the world into a mutual eyeing and estimation, and moreover often into a competitive struggle , a measuring of forces understood as abilities. Such a measuring inevitably takes place in the encounter between those who are similar in their who-stands. Such a similarity is required in order that a vertical ranking of better and worse can be performed. A hostile contest between individuals over their respective standings as who lies at the opposite extreme to the phenomenon of flattery. In flattery, one individual gives ground to the other and apparently willingly boosts the other's who-standing in order to extract some advantage from it, whereas when individuals contest with each other who stands higher in the estimation of who-status, this can be a more or less open measuring of powers with no trace of flattery, but rather more likely of mutual disparagement and hostility. Whereas flattery is behavi...
the second question:AUSTRAG, greekplan (2003-04-21 12:19:28): I don't konw the english translation for Heidegger's "Austrag".My question is how to elaborate the relationship between "Austrag" and "Ereignis". "Austrag"="Ereignis"?...
looking for advices, greekplan (2003-04-21 11:33:17): I am a chinese student majoring in philosophy.Now i am writing my paper on Heideger's thought of language.The exact title is"The essence of language---from Heidegger's view".My paper's scheme is: 1.Sprache als Sprache 2.Das Wesen der Sprache 3.die Sprache des Wesens(die Sprache des Sein' 4.Ereignis(language and being are transformated together into Ereingnis) The scheme above is a little hard for me,so i came here for advanced advices.How to elaborate heidegger's thought of "the essence of language"?...
Lecture 15, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-04-15 02:44:21): Lecture 15 In standard translations, politikh/ is rendered as Staatskunst or 'politics'. But what is politics? The Greek po/lij was not a state in the modern sense but an historical way of living together, gathered around the pole ( po/loj ) of a shared understanding of the world. Politics in the Greek sense has to be understood as the deliberative care for the issues that concern living together in intercourse with one another. In this deliberation on what is to be done and what laws are to be posited, rhetoric appeals in words to what is "always most pleasantly uplifting" ( t%= a)ei\ h(di/st% 464d). Plato refuses to accord rhetoric the title of an art ( te/xnh ), and calls it instead a mere empirical skill ( e)mpeiri/a 465a) which "does not have any defining, insightful lo/goj at all" ( ou)k e)/xei lo/gon ou)de/na 465a). For genuine practitioners of the technical arts, by contrast, "each has a view of their proper final work" ( ble/pontej pro\j to\ au)tw=n e)/rgon e(/kastoj 503d) so that "what is worked on is given a certain definite shape like some kind of look" ( o(/pwj a)\n ei)=doj ti au)t%= sxv= tou=to o\( e)rgi/zetai 503e). For the Greeks, te/xnh is a kind of knowledge which has clearly in pre-view what is to be brought forth and which guides the actions performed by the craftsman, etc. so that, bit by bit, the final look of what he has in view takes on shape. An empirical skill, by contrast, does not have such insight and works only according to rules of thumb about "what usually happens" ( ei)wqo/toj gi/gnesqai 501b). The lo/goj of te/xnh is able to discursively define the final look of the work to be produced by specifying the cause for each thing ( ai)ti/an e(ka/stou 465a) and knowing "what its nature or being is" ( a)/tta th\n fu/sin e)sti/n 465a). According to Plato's assessment,...
'Umwelt', ottomanic-dasein (2003-04-12 07:21:09): 'Umwelt'is only into 'in-der-Welt-sein'???,how can we mean that is...is & I intend to write a article on traditional distirict whose name is 'üsküdar'...Heidegger's 'umwelt' can be considered for 'Üsküdar' I am not able solve,if 'umwelt' is likely ontic- environment, How is related with'in- der-welt-sein'? ....Thanks...
phusikês akroaseôs b.1.3 193a28, Peter Danenberg (2003-04-09 07:22:05): δύναμις corresponds to τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λὸγον ; ἐντελέχεια , on the other hand, to φύσις . The question remains, therefore, whether δύναμις is mutable, or immutable but of variable completion according to the success of its delimitation by λόγος . τὸ δυνάμει ὄν is in any case contingent upon τὸ ἐντελεχαίᾳ ὄν , as, borrowing from “ περὶ ζῶν γενέσεως ”, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τὸ δυνάμει ὄν γίγνεται (734a30). ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρ χὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μο&...
Lecture 14, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-04-08 03:07:27): Lecture 14 Flattery False relations with others in the second person are also exemplified by the phenomena of sycophancy and flattery. Flattery is the practice of praising or complimenting unduly or insincerely, of gratifying the vanity or self-esteem of someone to make him self-complacent, to make him feel honoured or distinguished. Here it is the self-estimation of the other that is pandered to in order to insincerely, and thus falsely, elevate them in their feeling of self-standing. The other encounters the world through my flattering words or lo/goi , which effect an uplifting of mood in the other and an accompanying exaltation or aggrandizing of his self-estimation. Sycophancy is an extreme form of flattery and thus an extreme form of falsity in my dealings with another. As a sycophant, I am a mean, servile, cringing, or abject flatterer, i.e. a parasite, toady, lickspittle who toadies in attending to the other with servility from interested motives in order to gain some advantage from him. As a toady, I have lost all self-respect and made myself lower from base motives. In their not so obvious and extreme forms, both flattery and conceit permeate and lubricate relations with others and social life as a whole. Being a social being implies always, no matter how latently, the concern ( Besorgnis ) and even anxiety with one's own standing vis-à-vis the other. We flatter each other's vanity if only to find favour with the other, to dispose them well toward us. Respect for the other and flattery are often indistinguishable, ambiguous. Respect for the other expressed in politeness can slip into the subtle attempt to boost the other's vanity. We also present ourselves to each other from our best sides, hint at our abilities in incidental remarks in order to show the standing of who we are. Such self-display is...
phusikês akroaseôs b.1.2 193a9, Peter Danenberg (2003-04-05 21:29:53): The dichotomy of nature, sponteneity and persistence ( ουσία ), takes precedence over technical intervention of an accidental kind ( διάθεσις , ἕξις ), that is, the ordinance according to principle. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκά στῳ, ἀρρύθμιστον ὂν καθ' ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. σημεῖον δέ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδὼν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κ ...
phusikês akroaseôs b.1.1 192b8, Peter Danenberg (2003-04-03 18:32:08): The establishment of τί τὸ φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰ τίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ [1ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν]1, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχει κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κα`...
Introduction, Peter Danenberg (2003-04-03 18:23:40): “Aristotelis Physica” represents an ongoing project to out-lay and record those passages of Aristotle relevant to Heidegger’s Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie . ...
Lecture 13, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-04-01 02:50:57): Lecture 13 Here the phenomenon of the truth and falsity of being in the first and second persons shows its face. Whereas philosophy has traditionally been concerned with truth in the third person, i.e. with how beings show themselves of themselves, especially in science, which strives to bring things to light in terms of a scientific explanation, truth in the first and second persons has been more at home in the realm of literature and drama. This means that the ontological dimensions of first and especially second person being have to date not been laid sufficiently bare by way of questioning, philosophical discourse. Falsity of whoness Truth and falsity of whoness have to be distinguished from truth and falsity of whatness. With regard to the latter, beings can show themselves as what they are not, so that human understanding is deceived by the self-showing of things themselves. Apart from their self-showing in immediate presence, beings are also called to presence and defined in their presentation by human speech. Herein lies already a possibility of a discrepancy between how something shows itself of itself and how the logos presents it. When the logos is used to communicate something in intercourse with others, the others only see what is presented through the medium of the logos, which may well be inadequate or simply false. If someone intentionally says something to be the case which he knows in truth to be otherwise, this is lying , a phenomenon not only ubiquitous in everyday living, but also well-known in philosophy. In the phenomenon of lying, a situation is presented to others in the medium of speech to be otherwise than the speaker in truth knows it to be. Since all situations are more or less ambiguous, a liar always has the opportunity of pleading ignorance...
Lecture 12, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-03-22 01:40:40): Lecture 12 The reference here to hierarchy shows that being somewho implies a vertical dimension within which social place has its place. Social standing belongs to the being, i.e. the presence as self-presentation, of a person. The recognition and appraisal of each other as who is always already an estimation of how high or low our respective social standings are. This verticality consists not only in being held in high or low regard in accordance with the abilities we put on display, but also in the social rank occupied in society, such ranking being a function of wealth or power or authority. Weighty words of authority The words uttered by those who stand higher in social standing either by dint of wealth or political power carry more weight than those of lower social standing. For the most part in quotidian life, words are an expression of opinion. A wealthy person's carries more weight than that of a poor person because the wealthy person will generally act in accordance with the opinion he holds in spending his money, from which others may benefit. Those who hold an office in the polity wield power, and therefore their official opinions carry weight because power over others will be wielded in accordance with the official's considered opinion. It is not so much the person himself that speaks, but his office, his social rank. In holding the honour ( timh/ ) of an office ( timh/ ), the office itself is honoured when the office-holder speaks. But words are not only the expression of opinion. They can also make a claim to truth, i.e. to be knowledgeable, and to carry weight by virtue of being true, i.e. disclosive of a given situation or matter in its undistorted truth. In social intercourse, utterances are made very frequently with a claim to saying what the case is. A claim to saying the truth about some particular matter...
Lecture 11, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-03-15 02:07:52): Lecture 11 Standing as who endangered Here, however, we are considering how a man, or, more precisely, a manly human being, comes to stand in the world as somewho in the regard of both himself and others. What is beneficial or detrimental for such a stand in the world, provided in the first place by one's vocation, has to be seen with respect to others who are encountered in the world. Specifically, the reputation which I enjoy in the world, who I am held to be by others, can be either confirmed or denied, and I can thus be either respected or defamed as somewho. Who I am , i.e. my being-in-the-world itself, is exposed to the vicissitudes of assessment and appraisal by others. This is an essential moment of the phenomenon of sharing the world with others, i.e. of being a z%=on politiko/n . Human being as 'political living' signifies being in the polis with others in such a way that the logos defines this presence. This does not mean only that humans share their being in the world by talking about the affairs which mutually concern them, i.e. by communicating (which is the primary traditional and fairly innocuous view of how z%=on politiko/n is to be interpreted), but that humans share the world with each other in such a way that they reciprocally define through the logos who they are as somewho or other. Reputation is a phenomenon constitutive of social being itself, and social being is not a mere supplement to human being but constitutive of human being itself. The German word for defamation, Rufmord , literally 'murder committed against a reputation', is no exaggeration of the significance of the phenomenon of defamation or character assassination, which can indeed decide the existence of a human being. There are therefore dangers in being someone with a reputation as somewho in a shared world, a polis, and the condition of possibility of...
Lecture 10, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-03-08 02:07:26): Lecture 10 How others speak about me in what I am good for is my reputation, my social being in the medium of the logos. They address me as somewho by my unique proper name, in which they call me to presence, and they call me to presence for others (second-person being merged into third-person being) by referring to me by my proper name. My reputation is thus a structured phenomenon consisting of both my proper name and my vocational abilities by which I am called. To stand in estimation with others, I must make a name for myself as someone who is capable of doing such-and-such. My proper name is linked with my vocation, and it is through this link that I make a name for myself in being circulated by the logos in what people say about me — my reputation. Making a name for myself can be regarded as my self-production in the sense of me bringing myself forth as a name that is circulated in the public sphere. Making a name for myself means bringing myself into public presence as a well-defined, recognizable name connected with a certain aura of reputation regarding my vocational abilities. Persona and encounter with the world as uplifting or downcasting As a defined look, my reputation is also my persona , my mask which defines my public, social being, my being-exposed to the openness of being held to be someone by others. Who I am vocationally is a matter of understanding which also has continuity and defines me over time in my social life within the defining standingness of being. When others call me and address me as someone with abilities of such-and-such a kind, they call me to a stand in being, they define me in a way in which both they understand me and I understand myself. But I am also myself in the way I find my self, mich befinde , in each moment, in each particular situation, in my momentary mood or Befindlichkeit...
Lecture 9, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-03-01 02:13:52): Lecture 9 The look of myself which I present to others in my self-showing, my showing-off of who I am, is not merely a look seen by the eyes. Such a look is always an understood look seen by the mind's eye, the 'eye of understanding' which sees more than what the eyes see physically. How I show myself off in the social domain in my physical presentation is always already understood by others in some, usually unarticulated way. My self-showing as a showing-off always makes an impression on others' understanding. They understand in some way or other the ei)=doj which I present. But this immediate look which I present of myself is further elaborated in understanding in being articulated by means of speech, lo/goj . Such an articulated understanding of who someone is as somewho is their reputation . Both the German word for 'reputation' Ruf , and the etymology of 'fame', from Greek fh/mh 'fame' and fa/nai 'to speak', show that who I am is above all something that is heard and understood, my reputation. The power of the lo/goj in defining and constituting being can be seen here once again. Not only is the lo/goj the way of addressing beings and thus appropriating them in their being in the discourse of understanding which can be shared with others, but as fame and reputation , the lo/goj appropriates also the dimension of second-person being. Who I am as a social being is my reputation, what is said about me and heard in hearsay by others. The essential circumstance that the lo/goj is the medium of truth means that both beings in the third persons, things, and beings in the second person, human individuals, depend on the logos which is said about them being adequate to how they show themselves of themselves. Human being is not just to\ z%=on lo/gon e)/xon , i.e. the living being which has the logos, but, insofar as human being is exposed ...
Last God, mcausey (2003-02-26 08:51:01): Why does Heidegger speak of the "last" god (der letzte Gott) in the Contributions (Beiträge zur Philosophie)? Why "last"? Why not "another" or a "new" or "the next" god? How is the way prepared for this god to show? Are we given any formal conditions for this in the Contibutions or elsewhere?...
Lecture 8, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-02-22 01:29:00): Lecture 8 The uniqueness of individual existence is signified in the first place by a unique logos with which the individual concerned is to be addressed, namely, the Eigenname , the proper or ownmost name which should not be confused with any other. An individual human is a specific being, a to/de ti , in having its own proper name or o)/noma . The proper name is a special logos by which an individual human being as such is named, called, addressed. Calling and naming: bearing a proper name Calling and addressing each other by one's proper name are social acts which are embedded in the dimension of esteem and recognition. The first act of social recognition is to address an individual by its proper, ownmost name. To be recognized as this unique individual, it is not sufficient for me to be addressed by those categories which are applicable also to beings in the third person such as a 'human' or a 'customer' or a 'citizen'. We need to ask about the reinterpretation of the leading category of Greek metaphysics, ou)si/a , whose translations, substance and essence, have played a dominant role throughout Western thinking. Can ou)si/a be understood also with regard to the second-person dimension of whoness? In its most elaborate meaning as to\ ti/ h)=n ei)=nai , ou)si/a is what the being always already was in its descent from the 'look' or ei)=doj which defines ( o(ri/zein ) it through its limits ( pe/rata cf. Aristotle Metaphysics Book Delta Ch. 8). What is the definition of a person as who in the look it presents to others which is analagous to the look of a being such as a solid body delimited and outlined as what it is by its surface? A human being, too, has a body whose defining limits are seen by others in everyday life, and this look of the human individual concerned is also unique. But to be the look of this unique indiv...
Indexes GA 65 by Daniel Fidel Ferrer., Daniel Ferrer (2003-02-19 11:38:04): Dear Group, I have created some indexes to GA65. http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/beit.htm I would be interested in what indexes to Heidegger people find usefully? The more philosophical issues is why Heidegger was against them even though SuZ has one. Perhaps he was only against the use of indexes with the historical lectures writings? Also, you might have a look at In Heideggers frühen Schriften erwähnte Autoren at http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/HeideggerAutoren.pdf Yours, Daniel fidel Ferrer....
Current research Feb 2003 Daniel Fidel Ferrer., Daniel Ferrer (2003-02-19 11:33:03): I am currently working on Heidegger's remarks about SuZ in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)GA 65. I think it is a good topic. I call this Heidegger on Heidegger. I think this topic will be very heated when see GA 82. 82 Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen. According to GA-65 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) this will include: Anmerkungen zu "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1936), Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit" (1936), Laufende Anmerkungen zu "Sein und Zeit" (1935/1936). See also GA66. Heidegger on Heidegger. When this appears it is expected to widely read. Heidegger said about this project, "Auf diesen Entwurf geht alles zu und den Bereich dieser Besinnungen gehört auch die Eine Auseinandersetzung mit "Sein und Zeit". Diese Vorarbeiten sind immer neue Anläufe, um die Grundstellung für die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seyns zu finden." (GA 66 p.424). What do you think? Yours - Daniel Fidel Ferrer....
Some online articles on Heidegger by Daniel Fidel Ferrer., Daniel Ferrer (2003-02-19 11:27:24): Dear Group, I have put some articles online: "Martin Heidegger and the new other beginning (Anfang)" http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/MHbeginning.html "Martin Heidegger Contra Hegel" http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/HeideggerContraHegel.htm "Aphorisms on Martin Heidegger's Nietzsche Encounter" http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/HeideggerNietzscheEnc.htm "Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche's Overman: Aphorisms on the Attack" http://www.lib.cmich.edu/bibliographers/danielferrer/HeideggerOverman.htm Thanks, Daniel Fidel Ferrer....
Who is "Redaction"?, Peter Danenberg (2003-02-17 11:36:16): Redaction is comprised of students and assistants from Harvard and abroad who have consorted to question Heidegger as a philosopher and amateur philologist, quite afield from the extra-philosophical libel which seeks rather to defame him than edify the apposite scholarship. Redaction, in turn, makes up the editorial board of Mitdasein; and our tonic takes its leading tone from James Murray, late editor of the OED: "It is one of the hateful characteristics of a degenerate age, that the idle world will not let the worker alone [...], but must insist upon turning him inside out, and knowing all about him, and really troubling itself a great deal more about his peculiarities & personal pursuits, than his abiding work." Ad rem , therefore, before ad hominem . On behalf of your Redaction team, Peter Danenberg ...
Lecture 7, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-02-15 03:09:32): Lecture 7 But it is not just things that present themselves in their looks to human being for their estimation as being valuable, estimable; human beings too present themselves to each other in the look ( ei)=doj ) of their worthiness which they mutually estimate. The dimension of human worth within which humans reveal themselves to each other could be called that of worthiness or esteem , which comprises all those aspects of regard, respect, honour, recognition, appraisal, appreciation related to human estimation including all the negations of these such as disregard, disrespect, contempt, lack of recognition, disparagement, depreciation. This dimension of esteem or second-person being is one of the manifold folds in the unfolding of the openness of being. Just as things do not present themselves in their being to human being simply in a neutral, 'value-free' way, so too, humans do not present themselves as human beings to each other outside the dimension of worthiness or esteem. Such 'value estimation' of others is not superadded to a neutral or 'objective', 'value-free' cognisance of the other, but rather, the being of human beings for each other is always and fundamentally estimable. Truth in the second person: showing-off What is estimated in the self-showing of human individuals to each other? How is such self-showing possible? Just as there is an a)pofa/nsij of beings as such to human being in which beings show themselves as what they are in their truth, so too is there an a)pofa/nsij of human beings for each other which is rather an a)pofai/nesqai in the middle or medium voice. A)))pofai/nesqai with respect to humans means 'to make a display of myself', 'to show off' myself in my abilities to others. Such showing-off is analogous to the self-showing of beings as such in what they are. The analogy is held together and brought ...
Lecture 6, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-02-08 01:36:51): Lecture 6 Filoxrhmati/a is the striving to bring into presence for the grasp of the hand those beings which are good for living ( xrh/mata , pra/gmata ). The categories of Aristotelean metaphysics, above all du/namij and e)ne/rgeia , are won first and foremost by focusing on the relation of human being to pra/gmata , especially in the practice of production ( poi/hsij ). But it is not the act of production which comes into focus in considering the striving of filoxrhmati/a , but rather that of acquisition ( kth=sij ) which generally involves a specific social relation of exchange ( a)llagh/ ), i.e. a relation with others ( pro\j e(/teron ). The striving for goods itself, however, is directed at what may be termed somewhat imprecisely beings in the third person , i.e. things (including humans as things). The relation of human being to beings in the third person has a certain priority in Greek metaphysics, a fact which should not be underestimated. First person being and second person being This does not mean that the first person and the second person are entirely neglected in Greek thinking but that the metaphysical categories are fashioned principally on the model of human relations to things. The first person signifies the relation of a human individual to itself. Human being is not only an openness to the world; it is moreover a finding oneself and being aware of oneself in one's openness to the world. The world affects the individual human being in its openness to the world in the moods in which each individual continually finds and is aware of itself, in its various Befindlichkeiten . The moods ( pa/qh ) are modes of movement ( ki/nhsij ) of human being under the impact of its ineluctable encounters with the world. Aristotle devotes many of his texts, in particular the Rhetoric and De Anima , to analyzing the mode of human bei...
Bibliography on GA 33 (Meta. Theta), Evelyn Blaine (2003-02-03 01:06:36): Does anyone know of good secondary materials on Heidegger's lecture course on Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta (Band 33 in the GA) other than G. Agamben's comments on it in his Potentialities and the few early reviews I've been able to dig up in the Philosopher's Index? Best, Evelyn...
HEIDEGGER VISTO DA CACCIARI, GIORELLO, VATTIMO & C, Stromerhannes (2003-02-02 04:31:33): HEIDEGGER VISTO DA CACCIARI, GIORELLO, VATTIMO & C Lunedì 3 febbraio ore 20.30: Massimo Cacciari, Giulio Giorello, Giovanni Reale, Emanuele Severino, Gianni Vattimo e Franco Volpi parleranno di Martin Heidegger in occasione dell'uscita del volume "Holzwege. Sentieri erranti nella selva", Bompiani Editore. Modera la serata: Antonio Gnoli. Teatro Franco Parenti Via Pier Lombardo, 14 Tel 02 56561...
Heidegger and Tolkein, caleb (2003-02-01 22:24:13): My exposure to Heidegger is limited to a couple courses in college, neither of which I did very well in. I know that both Heidegger and Tolkein were often critical of how technology was percieved and used in their era, and that they were both writing at about the same time. I was wonderng if anybody has done any scholarship on the connection, mabey placing them both within a larger anti-technology movement. Just idle curiosity. Thanks ...
Lecture 5, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-02-01 01:43:53): Lecture 5 Plato determines this virtue of dikaiosu/nh as a being-in-joint within the individual soul in its relations to the world, in the way it encounters the world, and not as an in-jointness of relations among members of society ( pro\j e(/teron V i. 1129b27, 1130a3, 8, 13), as Aristotle does in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics . The phenomenon of being-in-joint refers to a proper structure of human being in both the relations among the various aspects of the soul and relations with the world. Recapitulation and summary What can be concluded from this rough sketch of how Plato unfolds the four principal virtues and the structure of the human soul in Book IV of the Politeia with regard to the phenomenon of manliness, which is the focus of attention? First of all, that manliness is a steadfast holding of a stand and a stance in view of all that is terrible or detrimental in human being's encounters with the world in the openness of its being. Second, that practical understanding plays the lead role in assessing the situation within which an individual finds itself. Third, that practical understanding itself is a kind of bringing-the-world-to-a-stand within the looks which beings offer of themselves and the categories that allow beings qua beings to be addressed and discussed and deliberated upon in the medium of the logos. Fourth, that practical understanding mobilizes and directs the strong and sometimes violent passions of the human heart (another aspect of the openness to being) in line with its assessment of the situation. Fifth, that, in contrast to sophrosyne, which has the task of bridling the desires in their striving to acquire the goods of the world, manliness controls rather the relations to what is dangerous and harmful, i.e. bad, in the world. It bridles recklessness, on the one hand and, on the other, it encour...
Pursuit of Truth, being-in-the-world (2003-01-30 00:53:36): Has ever an attempt been made to link the notion of 'aletheia' with the legal concept of truth and legal facts?...
the idea of substance, mark sinclair (2003-01-25 07:14:23): Would anyone happen to know where I might find a passage where Heidegger explicitly argues that the idea of substantia is itself ambiguous in the sense that it can mean a thing and the being of the thing. Heidegger does say this explicitly somewhere in the texts of the 1920s, but I can't find it at present. It would not seem to be in any of the obvious places, such as the genealogy of existence and essence in GA24. Any ideas anyone? Your help would be much appreciated....
Lecture 4, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-01-22 03:18:05): Lecture 4 Understanding is the faculty of standing presence in the sense that the world presents itself within its defined looks addressable by the logos. Temperance, on the other hand, maintains the stand of understanding by defining the limits of what human being sets its heart on. Such definition orders the individual's practical relations with beings in the world and allows it to maintain its stand as opposed to becoming the slave of its limitless desires and merely following its inclinations. Manliness as an alliance with understanding to control passion There remain the other two principal 'virtues' to be considered, a)ndrei/a and dikaiosu/nh . A)ndrei/a is aligned with qumo/j (439e) and o)rgh/ (440a), aspects of human being which are again related to ardent drive and striving and strong emotive passions such as anger, rage and violent displeasure. Qumo/j comes from the verb qu/ein , which means 'to move violently' 'to boil up in a passion'. Someone who is qumoeidh//j has the look or ei)=doj of passion and is given to being heated, wild, angry, courageous. Plato characterizes a)ndrei/a as a power ( du/namij ) which "rescues through everything a firm view with regard to what is terrible" ( dia\ panto\j sw/sei th\n peri\ tw=n deinw=n do/can 429b). Manliness concerns the relation of human being to the terrible ( ta\ dei/na ), to what is detrimental to human life and human living. Therefore it is 'negative' emotive passions which move the soul, for they are directed toward warding off something detrimental, whereas desire aims at acquiring something beneficial to living. Human being must take heart ( qumo/j ) to face the terrible. In certain situations in human living it is appropriate to get into a rage, a passion and anger to confront what is terrible or harmful. To lose one's firm stand in the face of dange...
looking for help..., xtzman (2003-01-18 14:33:24): i´m working on a paper that have this keywords: Time-Space-Object-EROSION-Subject-Ritual Anyone can help me? send me autores, books, sites, words, etc etc... Thanks...(sorry about mi english)...
Lecture 3, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-01-15 03:13:40): Lecture 3 The stand taken by understanding against desire Plato assigns to the insight of understanding the leading role in guiding the practical actions of an individual. But a human being is open to the world not merely by way of understanding beings in their self-showing and having insight into this self-showing. The human psyche is also desirous of beings, for the individual lacks many things which it needs to live well. These things are 'goods' ( ta\ a)gaqa/ ) in the broadest sense, toward which the human heart is directed. Human beings set their hearts on good things which they lack and which can contibute to them living well. This setting of the heart on something is what the Greeks call e)piqumi/a , from qumo/j which covers a broad semantic field encompassing 'heart', 'courage', 'vitality', 'will', 'decision', 'disposition' (cf. below regarding the virtue of a)ndrei/a ). Desire for something, the will to acquire it and to direct the heart toward it, emerges out of an individual's disposition as a whole. In desiring, the human psyche, i.e. human being, is directed toward beings in the world which are good for living, i.e. useful, xrhsto/j (438a). Such things are not restricted to merely physical desires such as food and drink which Plato discusses in Book IV with regard to this aspect of human being, but explicitly includes all those good and useful things which can be acquired ( xrhma/twn kth=sin 443e). Chremata are not just useful things which are good for something, but are goods also in the sense of assets and money. Chrematistics is the business of acquiring wealth and especially of making money as the universal equivalent for all goods. It is therefore mistaken to restrict the range of desire to things satisfying bodily, physical desires such as food and sex. Human desire is always already meta-physical in the sense that it exceeds from ...
Lecture 2, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-01-08 03:48:33): Lecture 2 These four virtues reappear in scholastic philosophy in the guise of the cardinal virtues (Lat. virtutes cardinales): prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice (cf. OED). To talk of 'good' and 'virtue' with respect to Plato and Aristotle is misleading insofar as these terms are inevitably understood in a moral sense. But in the context of these two thinkers' thinking on social life and the constitution of the polity of such living, the 'good' in question is ultimately living well ( eu)= zh=n ) or doing well ( eu)daimoni/a ). 'Good' is not a moral quality inhering in a human subject but is always good-for-living-well in society and thus always related to social practices beneficial or detrimental in a social world. Good is always pragmatic good relating to practical affairs or pra/gmata . The goodness of the polis which Plato casts in his Politeia is not that of perfect virtuousness of a city free from sin or morally without blame, but a perfect goodness in the sense that nothing remains to add to the degree of goodness for living well in the polity of such a polis. Likewise, the good citizen of such a polity is the one who is fit for contributing to its well-being. Phronesis is insight into practical affairs which allows actions to be well-deliberated ( eu)/bouloj 428b). It is the sight in which practical affairs come to light, the power of disclosure for how practical affairs show themselves. Such insight is the basis upon which deliberations and decisions are made and must play the leading role in a polis or an individual for it guides the actions either of the whole or its members. In Plato, phronesis is often used synonymously with other terms from which it should, strictly speaking, be distinguished, as Aristotle does. This is apparent in the present context of Book IV of the Politeia , where we read sofi/a (wisdom 427e) at one point, fro...
The Greeks' theory of knowledge, Tudor Georgescu (2003-01-05 12:27:15): Heidegger did not indulge himself into such "school philosophy". But, a knowledge vacuum left behind by him, it want to be filled. Heidegger, as well as C.G. Jung, Rudolf Steiner and Levy Bruhl suggested their way of being was the participatio mystica. I analyze such a stance at: The knowledge theory of an existentialist Gigantomachia peri tes ousias! Tudor Georgescu...
Lecture 1, Dr. Michael Eldred (2003-01-01 01:50:02): Lecture 1 The intention of the present lectures is to provide an introduction to the phenomenology of manliness. Phenomenology aims at showing up by means of discourse that which shows itself. That which shows itself can be so obvious and self-evident that it is hidden. The task of phenomenological thinking is then to make the obvious questionable. Such is the case with the phenomenon of manliness. As the word says, manliness signifies the being of manly beings as such. A manly being can be a man, but the word 'man' is not univocal in its meanings. 'Man' can signify mankind in general, or within mankind it can differentiate among humans as in man as distinct from boy or woman. Moreover, a woman can be manly and a man can be womanly. Plainly then, a manly being cannot be identified simply as an adult human being of the male sex. Rather, a manly being is a human being in the mode of being called manliness. We are caught here in a hermeneutic circle. We cannot unambiguously identify the set of beings defined by the term 'manly beings' without knowing clearly what manliness is, but how can we know what manliness is without knowing to what distinct set of beings it applies? Like all hermeneutic circles, the solution to this dilemma is to pass over the seeming logical difficulties and to simply enter the circle. A phenomenology of manliness asks the question concerning the mode of being of manly beings. Such an investigation is metaphysical or ontological in character. It investigates a certain sort of being in its being, to\ o)\)n $(= o/)/n . Without an understanding of what constitutes a metaphysical or ontological investigation, it is not possible to pursue the project of a phenomenology...
Current research: "zum anderen Anfang"., Daniel Ferrer (2002-12-13 06:12:37): Dear Friends, Heidegger starts GA 65 with the following statement: (first lines of the first section) "Die „Beiträge“ fragen in einer Bahn, die durch den Übergang zum anderen Anfang, in den jetzt das abendländische Denken einrückt, erst gebahnt wird. Diese Bahn bringt den Übergang ins Offene der Geschichte und begründet ihn als einen vielleicht sehr langen Aufenthalt, in dessen Vollzug der andere Anfang des Denkens immer nur das Geahnte aber doch schon Entschiedene bleibt." "Contributions to Philosophy enact a questioning along a pathway which is first traced out by the crossing to the other beginning, into which Western thinking is now entering. This pathway brings the crossing into the openness of history and establishes the crossing as perhaps a very long sojourn, in the enactment of which the other beginning of thinking always remains only intimation, though already decisive." What is the nature of the other beginning? In the future we are going to see the following works: GA 70 Über den Anfang (1941)(about 300 pages). GA 72 Die Stege des Anfangs (1944)(about 300 pages). Is this other begining simply the Sinn von Sein or the Wahrheit des Seyns (i.e. Heidegger) or is there more too it than that? Joseph Fell in 1971 seems to suggest that the other beginnig is the Ge-Stell and Geviert. What do we know now that he did not know then or is he right? Thoughts? Reflections? Musings? Yours, Daniel Ferrer....
§3. "Bestimmung des Begriffs..." / "Determination of the concept...", Peter Danenberg (2002-12-12 17:54:46): Heidegger: »Die Logik« ist ein Gewächs der hellenistischen Schulphilosophie, die die philosophischen Forschungen der Vergangenheit schulmäßig bearbeitete. (Heidegger, 9) Thus, on the one hand, a mere aping of Kant's doxa : Die jetzige Logik schreibt sich her von Aristoteles' Analytik. Dieser Philosoph kann als der Vater der Logik angesehen werden. (Kant, 442.30) Again on the other hand, Heidegger raises an historicism critique wherein supposèd immortal propositions have a demonstratedly human nativity. Kant, however, stoops to a critique of connoissance 1), abjuring the nakèd Schulweisheit and obtrusive subtelty of Aristotle, while praising his unparagoned thoroughness in establishing the moments of man's thinking ὄÏ?γανον ( organon ). ____________________ 1) sic ; see 1762–71 H. Walpole Vertue's Anecd. Paint. (1786) IV. 33 "Being in search of a proper term for this science, Mr. Prior proposed to name it connoissance ; but that word has not obtained possession as connoisseur has." (OED) Kant, Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logic 2 . Frankfurt, 1996. ...
§2. "Voraussetzungen..." / "Preconceptions...", Peter Danenberg (2002-12-10 22:04:31): "5. das menschliche Leben hat in sich die Möglichkeit, sich einzig auf sich selbst zu stellen [...]." (Heidegger, 6) We mark a curious mutation from the Handschrift , which instead reads: "5. daß es im Dasein eine Möglichkeit gibt, in der es sich einzig auf sich selbst stellt [...]." (Heidegger, 334) That he should have preferred, in pre- Sein-und-Zeit , the generalisation "das menschliche Leben" over "Dasein", portends, perhaps, an inner ambivalence over the expression, whose substantiation (hypostasis) it was the end of Sein und Zeit to secure. ...
§1. "Die philologische Absicht der Vorlesung" / "The philological till* of the seminar", Peter Danenberg (2002-12-09 16:56:31): *s. Î Ï?ότασις for a discussion of till . "Wenn Philologie besagt: die Leidenschaft der Erkenntis des Ausgesprochenen , dann ist das, was wir treiben, Philologie." (Heidegger, 4) Thus did he saucily beard the ancient clan of philosopher and philologist, reminding us of Seneca's saw: Itaque quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est. (Epistulae, 108.23) How far he takes this remains to be seen; the gage should at least be ear-marked. Note passingly the positive characterization of Aristotelean privation: στÎÏ?ησις, die Bestimmung des Seienden, die vollzogen wird in dem, was es nicht hat; diese στÎÏ?ησις, das »Nichthaben«, bestimmt ein Seiendes durchaus positiv; (Heidegger, 4) It might seem at first noteworthy that Heidegger declined to characterize στÎÏ?ησις positively, noting the lack of negating particle, much as in the Latin prÄ«vÄ?tiÅ? , whose root prÄ«vus (whence "private") means, according to Walde-Hofmann (Heidelberg, 1982), simply "für sich bestehend, einzeln"; but upon examination of the corresponding passage in Aristotle, one notes that he himself had recourse to the negative ( τὸ μὴ ὄν ) in describing στÎÏ?ησις: ἔτι τῶν á¼?ναντίων ἡ ἑτέÏ?α συστοιχία στέÏ?ησις, καὶ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, καὶ εἰς ἓν καὶ πλῆθος, οἷον στάσις τοῦ ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους: (1004b27) ...
Î Ï?ότασις, incipit, welcome, Peter Danenberg (2002-12-09 12:56:53): Welcome to the forum. The till * of this series is a preparatory encounter with the the newly published eighteenth volume of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe, "Fundaments of Aristotelean Philosophy" ( Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie . Klostermann, 2002). Our main strategy is a negative one: to refrain from deriving unripe consequences and an over-reliant comparison of outside sources. We will proceed paragraph by paragraph, establishing the topology of the text and cultivating a general ascesis of reading which, not ambitioning to outstrip modesty in the derivation of proposition, may, through constant application, engender a judicious hind- and foresight. Best, Your Peter Danenberg * OED: OHG. zilôn, zilên to strive (G. zielen to aim, strive) ...
Heidegger Verdacht, kairoskate (2002-12-06 21:41:48): Why is it that Americans participate in such Anglo-Saxon war-time hubris over against the German intellectuals? kairoskate...
Peter Danenberg <danenberg at mitdasein dot com>